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I analyze a model of electoral competition in which a candidate￿ s reputation and his need of cred-
ibility restricts his policy choice to a certain subset of the policy space, its ideology set. Candidates
are o¢ ce-motivated. They care about winning and also about the share of votes they get. I consider
both two and three party systems. I describe the equilibrium outcomes assuming that plurality rule
applies, and obtain for two party competition, in some cases, equilibrium outcomes di⁄erent than
what the median voter theorem suggests because of the restrictions on the ideology sets implied by
the credibility constraints. I show that centrist parties are disadvantaged compared to leftist and
rightist ones, since, in equilibrium, leftist and rightist parties choose policy points that are as close as
possible to each other and obtain votes from the centrist parties￿ideology set. A centrist candidate
needs a higher concentration of voters in his credibility set compared to his opponents in order to
have a chance to win. I also analyze a run-o⁄ system for three parties and show that centrist parties
have more opportunities to win under this rule than under plurality rule.
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11 Introduction
In the last decades, it has been argued that the political view of society members (voters) has smoothened
compared to the past and that most people would de￿ne themselves to be more centrist. A study
conducted by CIS in Spain shows that the response to the question "In politics it is being talked about
left and right. On a scale where 0 is left and 10 is right where would you put yourself?" had a mean of
4.56 in 1997 and 4.32 in 2005. Moreover, in 1997 51.3% of the people who answered the question located
themselves between 4 and 6, that is, the very center of the political spectrum. Blais and Bodet (2006)
report the results for a similar question for 21 countries and 31 elections and ￿nd that except for two
countries (Germany and Israel) the median voter is located at the midpoint. Although this ￿nding does
not include the exact density around the center it can be argued that it shows the necessary condition
to be able to talk about the importance of the center which is that the median voter should necessarily
be located in the center. Considering this aspect, one should expect that centrist parties should have
encountered an increasing advantage to win elections. Daalder (1984) states that the idea of de￿ning
themselves as centrist parties has been considered attractive by politicians. Duverger (1964) argues
however, that "although the "Centre" is the main force of the parliamentary life", that is, although
the majority of voters are located ideologically close to the very center of the political spectrum, the
electoral system favors ideologically leftist or rightist parties. This paper intends to show the conditions
under which one could think that Duverger￿ s statement applies by analyzing a three candidate electoral
competition model, and by arguing that plurality rule is an electoral system that favors leftist and rightist
parties whereas a centrist candidate would have more chances of winning under a run-o⁄ rule than under
plurality rule.
One of the main features of our analysis is the consideration of credibility constraints. In the real world
electoral competition, it is a rather rare situation that candidates can choose their policy or campaigning
points among all the hypothetically possible ones. Normally we see that candidates face restrictions over
the sets of policies that they can propose as campaign promises. Furthermore, one can observe that the
set of policies that are credible for one candidate usually does not coincide with the set of policies that
are credible for a di⁄erent candidate. In order to formalize this observation, in this paper I will assume
that each candidate (or party) will be able to choose its policy point from a certain subset of the whole
interval of policy points. In a one dimensional policy space, the strategy set of a candidate, that is, the
subset of the policy space from which a candidate can choose a policy point that would be considered as
credible by the voters would simply be an interval of the policy line. It can be argued that, the larger
the interval of a candidate, the higher is the credibility that he has among the voters.
2Think about parties or candidates that have been competing for a certain number of elections. A
party having claimed or acted for a long period to be ideologically leftist would lose its credibility if it were
to state that from now on it were to follow a rightist point of view. Alesina (1988) states that candidates
obtain credibility through reputation in an in￿nitely repeated game. This reputation, for a party that
wins the election, makes deviations from the announced policy point to another policy which is preferred
by the party too costly. This result, I believe, could be considered as a justi￿cation for the assumption
that I will follow in terms of the permissible intervals. It is assumed that competing candidates have a
history of past competition, and the speci￿ed intervals de￿ne the limit points of policy announcements
that would be considered as credible by voters.
I consider an electoral competition where candidates have a history of policy choices. This history
de￿nes them ideologically as leftist, rightist or centrist. In my framework, one could say that "Voters
discipline candidates by believing some promises a candidate makes as long as"1 these promises coincide
with the set of promises that voters accept as credible in terms of the ideological statements of the
candidates. That is, the intervals of acceptable policy points for each ideology are de￿ned as the sets
of policy points that voters consider credible given the party·s history of policy choices. Aragones et
al. (2005) show that in a repeated electoral competition where voters can punish candidates, parties
can credibly commit to policy points which belong to an interval around their ideal points. Taking this
result as granted, I assume in my model that these intervals are exogenously determined considering that
candidates already have a history of past choices.
Casamatta and De Donder (2005) also consider exogenously given credibility intervals, which are
symmetric around the ideal points of the candidates. These intervals do not intersect and each candidate￿ s
interval has the same length. Di⁄erent than my model, they assume that candidates care only about
the policy implemented by the winner. They analyze equilibrium outcomes under plurality rule and
proportional representation for two and four candidate electoral competitions. Under plurality rule they
obtain that the introduction of extreme parties causes that the centrist parties choose either the same
policy point under two parties or more extreme ones. Di⁄erent than their ￿nding, I obtain that the
policy point decision of the centrist candidate depends only on the distribution of ideal points of voters.
Samuelson (1984) constructs a model of two candidate electoral competition under probabilistic voting
where candidates are restricted to choose their strategies close to their initial points, which are a product
of previous political activity, in order not to loose credibility. Rather than taking the credibility sets
as exogenously given he assumes that they are an endogenous function of candidates￿initial points. He
1Aragones et al. (2005) p.4
3obtains that, di⁄erent than the median voter theorem suggests, in equilibrium it is not always the case
that the two candidates tie.
Another important feature of the model presented here can be found in the de￿nition of the pay-
o⁄ function of the candidates. Stating that candidates care only about winning does not seem to be
su¢ cient to explain real-world electoral competition phenomena. Neglecting the e⁄ect of the share of
votes a candidate gets, would lead to unreasonable interpretations. It would mean that candidates
with no chance of winning would never enter the competition. However, in many situations there exist
candidates or parties who continue to compete despite the fact that they have no chance of winning.
These observations seem to imply that a reasonable candidate utility function should include the share of
votes as an argument. Therefore, I will include also the shares of votes they get into the utility function
of the candidates. One can consider that the higher its share of votes, the higher is the funding that
a candidate obtains from outside. Since outside funding is one of the vital sources that help parties to
survive, this is an important aspect to be considered given that in real world parties compete during
several elections. Moreover, as Osborne (1993) argues, entering the competition might be useful for a
candidate even if he loses as it might increase their credibility. It can be argued that the higher the share
of votes of a candidate the higher his credibility would be in further elections. In the following analysis
I do not consider repeated elections. I analyze only one period electoral competition under plurality
rule and run-o⁄ rule but this analysis helps to have an insight on real world electoral competition where
parties compete for repeated elections.
I consider an electoral competition on a one dimensional policy space, where voters vote sincerely,
with no abstention, and where each candidate can choose its policy point from a given subset of the
whole policy space. Candidates possess full information about the distribution of ideal points of voters.
I ￿rst consider a one-round electoral system and analyze the characteristics of the equilibrium outcomes
for di⁄erent credibility sets for two (leftist and rightist) and three candidate (leftist, rightist and centrist)
elections. I assume that the winner is determined by plurality rule. I analyze the equilibrium outcomes,
under di⁄erent speci￿cations for the intervals from which candidates can choose their policy points.
Cox (1987) shows that for a uniform distribution of voters, for candidates which are plurality max-
imizers, and for odd numbers of candidates (n) with n ￿ 3, there exists no Nash Equilibrium in pure
strategies. In fact, for three candidate competition he shows that there exist no equilibrium for a general
distribution under plurality rule when candidates are either plurality maximizers or complete plurality
maximizers or share maximizers. This result would also hold for a utility function of candidates de￿ned
as in my model, if candidates do not face any credibility constraints.
4In order to ensure the existence of an equilibrium in all cases, I maintain two assumptions on voters￿
behavior. The ￿rst assumption, which I maintain for both two and three candidate electoral competition,
characterizes the behavior of voters when two candidates choose the same policy point. It states that
voters do not consider as identical, candidates who are located on the same policy point. This could
be considered as a natural behavior since voters discipline candidates by believing only those policy
announcements that belong to a certain subset of the whole policy space. So, if two candidates have
di⁄erent credible policy sets, voters would perceive them as di⁄erent even if they announce the same
policy point.
For three candidate competition, under this assumption, I can guarantee the existence of an equi-
librium for the cases where the intervals of the three candidates intersect only at a single point. If the
intervals overlap, then for some parameter values this assumption can not guarantee the existence of
an equilibrium. Therefore, in this case I use a second assumption on voters￿behavior. The second as-
sumption I make characterizes the behavior of voters when the centrist candidate is located to the left
of the leftist candidate or to the right of the rightist candidate. I assume that, in these two cases, the
centrist candidate gets no votes. This behavior could be considered as a punishment applied by voters
for a centrist candidate who chooses to be more leftist than the leftist candidate or to be more rightist
than the rightist candidate.
The main result for two candidate electoral competition is that certain restrictions on intervals,
such that the median voter￿ s ideal point is located in the interval of at most one candidate, cause that
candidates choose policy points di⁄erent than the location of the median voter which might coincide or
not depend on the exact characteristics of the intervals. Therefore, in these cases the outcome is not the
same as it is suggested by the median voter theorem, which states that, in equilibrium, both candidates
are located at the ideal point of the median voter. Otherwise, the results coincide with the predictions
of the median voter theorem.
For the three candidate electoral competition, I show that in equilibrium the centrist candidate is
disadvantaged compared to the other two candidates, that is, he is less likely to win. I describe the
conditions under which a centrist candidate wins. I show also that since candidates are assumed to be
o¢ ce-motivated, leftist and rightist candidates prefer to converge to each other as much as their credibility
constraints allow. The centrist candidate wins when his opponents face small credibility sets and when
the share of voters with ideal points in his credibility set is fairly high. When the centrist candidate
cannot win, in many cases his policy choice determines the winner.
Having shown that a centrist candidate faces disadvantages under plurality rule, the next step would
5be to argue whether this also holds for di⁄erent election rules. I consider a run-o⁄ rule under the two
assumptions mentioned above and show that the run-o⁄ rule can be more advantageous for centrist
candidates. That is, the centrist candidate can win for larger credibility sets of his opponents compared
to plurality rule. The run-o⁄ rule I analyze is similar to the system "used for presidential elections
in France and several Latin American countries and in Israel between 1996 and 2001 to elect a prime
minister" (Callander 2005).2
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section I build up the model. In Section 3, I analyze
two-candidate electoral competition under the speci￿cations of the model. In Section 4, I focus on the
analysis of the three-candidate electoral competition. In Section 5, I analyze three-candidate electoral
competition under a run-o⁄ rule. In the last section I conclude with a brief discussion of the results.
2 Model
The model that I set up follows the classical analysis of Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957). I construct
a spatial model of elections where the policy space is represented by the interval [0,1], where 0 could be
considered as the most extreme leftist point and 1 as the most extreme rightist one.
2.1 Game
The game consists of a one period electoral competition. There is a ￿xed number of candidates3 and
a continuum of voters. Candidates declare their policy points simultaneously before the election and
full-commitment is assumed. Each candidate can credibly commit to a policy as long as it belongs to
a speci￿ed subset of the policy space. We assume that a non-credible strategy is always dominated by
a credible one, and therefore, we consider only credible strategies as potential equilibrium strategies.
Thus, the relevant strategy set for a candidate will be de￿ned as a particular subset of the interval. The
solution concept used is Nash equilibrium. The outcome of the game is the winner of the election who is
determined by plurality rule, that is, the candidate who gets the highest amount of votes is the winner,
or by a run-o⁄ rule. In the case of a tie, as a tie breaking rule, I assume that each candidate sharing the
highest percentage of votes will have the same probability of winning.
2Callander (2005) gives also examples of other run-o⁄ rules.
3In Section 3 I analyze two candidate electoral competition and in Sections 4 and 5 I analyze three candidate electoral
competition.
62.2 Candidates
I assume that candidates care only about winning with the highest share of votes possible, that is they are
o¢ ce-motivated. I consider ￿rst an environment in which two candidates j where j 2 J and J = fL;Rg
are competing. Later on, I analyze an environment in which three candidates j where j 2 J and
J = fL;C;Rg are competing. They could be considered as a leftist (L), a centrist (C) and a rightist (R)
candidate. In the case with two candidates, I assume that the leftist candidate can choose a policy point
from the interval [0;a] and the rightist candidate from the interval [1 ￿ a;1] with a 2 (0;1). For the case of
three candidates, I assume that the leftist candidate can choose a point from [0;a], the centrist candidate
can choose from [b;1 ￿ b] and the rightist candidate from [1 ￿ a;1] with a 2 (0;1) and b 2 (0; 1
2). Before
the election, all candidates declare their policy choices. The policy point chosen by the leftist candidate
is denoted as xL; the policy point chosen by the centrist candidate as xC, and the one of the rightist





U + v(sj) if j wins the election
U
n + v(sj) if j gets the highest amount of votes with n ￿ 1 more parties (n = 2;3)
v(sj) if j does not win the election
for j 2 fL;Rg if n = 2 and for j 2 fL;C;Rg if n = 3 with U
3 > v(1), sj 2 [0;1],
n P
j=1
sj = 1 and n ￿ 3
where v(sj) is a strictly increasing function; U a ￿xed utility obtained from winning and sj the share of
votes candidate j gets. Candidates primarily care about winning and the share of votes they get. Since
they are o¢ ce-motivated the utility obtained from winning outweighs the utility obtained from the share
of votes. So, their aim is to win with the highest share of votes possible. A candidate who cannot win,
simply chooses the policy point that maximizes his share of votes.
2.3 Voters
For the whole analysis, I assume that there is a continuum of voters who have single-peaked preferences
over the policy space with xi 2 [0;1] referring to their ideal points for all i 2 I. I assume that voters
preferences are represented by a utility function of Ui(xj) = ￿jxj ￿ xij where j 2 fL;C;Rg and where
xj￿ s are the policy point announcements of the candidates. The distribution of voters￿ideal points is
given by a continuos distribution function F(x) with x 2 [0;1].
Moreover, I exclude the possibility of abstention by thinking of a law making voting obligatory where
the penalty outweighs the cost of voting (or it could be assumed that voting has no cost). I assume
that voters vote sincerely, which could also be thought as a situation in which voters do not posses any
7information regarding neither the distribution of voters nor of the median voter4. Voters are not strategic
players of the game since sincere voting is assumed.
For the following analysis it will be assumed that candidates possess complete information about the
distribution of the voters. Throughout the whole analysis, I denote the ideal point of the median voter
as m.
3 Restricted Electoral Competition With Two Candidates
In this section I analyze two candidate electoral competition where the credible policy sets are given such
that the leftist candidate can choose a policy point from the interval [0;a] and the rightist candidate from
the interval [1 ￿ a;1] with a 2 (0;1) for three di⁄erent cases. First, I analyze the case where a = 1
2 (the
intervals of the two candidates intersect at a single point), then the case where a < 1
2 (the intervals of
the two candidates do not intersect) and ￿nally the case where a > 1
2 (the intervals of the two candidates
overlap). (see ￿gure)
4For two candidate competition, strategic voting and sincere voting would lead to the same equilibria. For three
candidate competition given that there is a continuum of voters assuming that voters do not have any information about
the distribution of ideal points, sincere voting would not lead to a non-rational behavior as voters could have any type of
beliefs which would justify casting a vote to the most preferred candidate.
8For the case of two candidates, a candidate has to get more votes than his opponent in order to win.
Moreover, since the share of votes a⁄ects the utility of candidates, the candidates want to win with the
highest share of votes possible. Since all voters vote, maximizing plurality is strategically equivalent to
maximizing share of votes, satisfying the su¢ cient conditions of the equivalence theorem of Aranson et
al. (1974).
As the intervals of both candidates may intersect or even overlap, it is possible that in equilibrium,
they announce the same policy point. However, voters perceive the candidates as ideologically di⁄erent
and, therefore, when both candidates choose the same policy point, the following assumption on voters￿
behavior will be made:
Assumption 1: If xL = xR, then all voters with xi < xL vote for the leftist candidate while all
voters with xi > xL vote for the rightist candidate.
This assumption could be considered as a tie-breaking rule for the voters. For some cases, without
Assumption 1 there would not exist an equilibrium.5 Throughout this section I assume that voters behave
as Assumption 1 suggests.
For a = 1
2, the results are as follows:
Proposition 1: If a = 1
2, then for all m, in equilibrium, xL = xR = 1
2 and:
i. L wins if m 2 [0; 1
2).
ii. R wins if m 2 (1
2;1].
iii. L and R tie if m = 1
2.
Proof: If m 2 [0; 1
2), L wins for sure by choosing xL such that 1
2 ￿ xL > m because he gets more
than half of the votes, i.e. sL > sR. Similarly, if m 2 (1
2;1], R wins for sure by choosing xR such that
1
2 ￿ xR < m because he can assure himself sR > sL. In both cases, under Assumption 1 the candidates
maximize their share of votes by choosing xL = xR = 1
2 because any xL 2 [0; 1
2) is strictly dominated
by xL = 1
2 and any xR 2 (1
2;1] is strictly dominated by xR = 1
2. The same holds if m = 1
2. In this
5When the intervals of the two candidates intersect and the ideal point of the median voter is located on a point which
is in the interval of only one of the two candidates, there exists no equilibrium. Consider for example the case where a = 1
2
and m < 1
2. Then xR = 1
2 is a strictly dominant strategy for R. Then, the best response of L would be xL = 1
2 ￿ ￿ with
￿ > 0 and close to 0. So, there exists no equilibrium. Under Assumption 1, xL = 1
2 is a strictly dominant strategy for L
and therefore, there exists an equilibrium. In general, Assumption 1 guarantees an equilibrium where the best response of
a candidate would be to be located at an ￿￿distance from his opponent without this assumption.
9case, sR = sL = 1
2 and they win with equal probability as a result of the tie breaking rule. If L deviates
to xL < 1
2 he would decrease sL which would lead to sR > sL making R the winner. If R deviates to
xR > 1
2 he would decrease sR which would lead to sR < sL making L the winner. Therefore, they have
no incentives to deviate and xL = xR = 1
2 constitutes the equilibrium. #
Proposition 1 states that in equilibrium both candidates will locate themselves at the same policy
point meaning that there can not be any di⁄erentiation between leftist and rightist points of view. As
opposed to the Hotelling model, candidates do not necessarily locate themselves at the ideal point of the
median voter unless m = 1
2 and they only win with equal probability if m = 1
2. If m 6= 1
2, the inclusion of
share of votes to the utility function of candidates re￿nes the existing equilibria. If the share of votes were
not included, then, for instance, if m 2 [0; 1
2), the leftist candidate would be indi⁄erent among choosing
any xL 2 (m; 1
2] because he would be the winner for sure. The rightist candidate losing for sure, could
locate himself at any point of his interval.
For a < 1
2 the results are as follows:
Proposition 2: If a < 1
2, then for all m, in equilibrium, xL = a, xR = 1 ￿ a and:
i. L wins if m < 1
2.
ii. R wins if m > 1
2.
iii. L and R tie if m = 1
2.
Proof: xL = a strictly dominates any xL 2 [0;a) and xR = 1￿a strictly dominates any xR 2 (1￿a;1].
Therefore, in equilibrium xL = a, xR = 1￿a. If m < 1
2, then sL > sR and L is the winner. If m > 1
2 then
sL < sR and R is the winner. If m = 1
2 then L and R win with equal probability since sL = sR = 1
2.#
The conclusion that can be drawn from Proposition 2 is that if a < 1
2 the candidates locate themselves
as close to each other as possible but the credibility constraints do not allow them to choose the same
policy point. As before, the inclusion of share of votes to the utility function of candidates re￿nes the
existing equilibria. If the share of votes were not included, then, for instance, if m 2 [0;a), the leftist
candidate would be indi⁄erent to locate himself at any xL 2 (m;a] because he would be the winner for
sure. The rightist candidate losing for sure, could locate himself at any point of his interval.
If a > 1
2 then the results are as follows:
Proposition 3: If a > 1
2, then in equilibrium:
i. xL = xR = 1 ￿ a and L wins if m 2 [0;1 ￿ a).
ii. xL = xR = a and R wins if m 2 (a;1].
10iii. xL = xR = m and R and L tie if m 2 [1 ￿ a;a].
Proof: If m 2 [0;1 ￿ a), the best reply for L is xR if xR ￿ a and a if xR > a. The best reply for
R is xL ￿ ￿ (￿ su¢ ciently small) if xL > 1 ￿ a and 1 ￿ a if xL ￿ 1 ￿ a. Therefore, in equilibrium xL =
xR = 1 ￿ a and L wins for sure since sL > sR. If m 2 (a;1], the best reply for L is xR + ￿ (￿ su¢ ciently
small) if xR < a and a if xR ￿ a. The best reply for R is 1 ￿ a if xL ￿ 1 ￿ a and a if xL > 1 ￿ a.
Therefore, in equilibrium xL = xR = a and R wins for sure since sR > sL. If m 2 [1 ￿ a;a], then the
best reply for L is xR + ￿ (￿ su¢ ciently small) if xR < m and xR if xR ￿ m. The best reply for R is
xL ￿ ￿ (￿ su¢ ciently small) if xL > m and xL if xL ￿ m. Therefore, in equilibrium xL = xR = m and
both candidates win with equal probability. #
If the intervals for the two candidates overlap, then, in equilibrium, both candidates locate themselves
always at the same point. Moreover, both candidates have the same incentive of locating themselves at
the median voter￿ s ideal point. However, due to the restrictions put on the intervals, the policy point
choice of both candidates coincides with the ideal point of the median voter only if the median voter￿ s
ideal point is in the interval of both candidates. As before, the inclusion of share of votes re￿nes the
existing equilibria. If the share of votes were not included, then, for instance, if m 2 [0;1￿a), the leftist
candidate would be indi⁄erent to locate himself at any xL 2 (m;1 ￿ a] because he would be the winner
for sure. The rightist candidate losing for sure, could locate himself at any point of his interval.
4 Restricted Electoral Competition With Three Candidates
In this section I analyze the same type of electoral competition as above but now I consider three
candidates, that is, a centrist candidate is introduced. The partition of the policy space is such that the
leftist candidate can choose a policy point from the interval [0;a], with 0 < a < 1, the centrist candidate
from [b;1 ￿ b] with 0 < b < 1
2 and the rightist candidate from [1 ￿ a;1]. In order to cover all possibilities,
I analyze four cases: a = b, b > a, 1
2 > a > b, and a ￿ 1
2. Similar to the two candidate electoral
competition, there might occur situations where two candidates are located on the same policy point.
For this cases, I assume that voters behave as the following assumption suggests.
Assumption 1.1: If xL = xC, then all voters with xi < xL vote for the leftist candidate while all
voters with (xR + xC)=2 > xi > xL vote for the centrist candidate. Similarly, if xR = xC, then all voters
with xi > xR vote for the rightist candidate while all voters with (xL + xC)=2 < xi < xR vote for the
centrist candidate.
As in the previous section, this assumption could be considered as a tie-breaking rule for the voters.
11For some cases, without this assumption there does not exist an equilibrium.6 Throughout the whole
analysis that follows, I assume that voters behave as Assumption 1.1 suggests.
As opposed to the case for two candidates where maximizing the probability of winning is strategically
equivalent to maximizing the share of votes, for three candidates as Osborne (1995) argues these two
strategies that correspond to these two objectives do not need to coincide. That is, a candidate who
would win may increase his share of votes by locating himself closer to one of his opponents and thereby
increasing the share of votes of his other opponent that much so that he can not win any more. To
visualize this situation, consider the following example:
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respectively. During the following analysis, Assumption 1.1 will be maintained. Therefore, choosing
6Consider intervals with a = b and a distribution of ideal points with m < a whose density function is strictly decreasing
for policy points greater than a. In that case, xC = a is a strictly dominant strategy for the centrist candidate. Then, the
best response of the leftist candidate would be xL = a￿￿ with ￿ > 0 and close to 0. So, there exists no equilibrium. (Notice
that xR would be equal to 1 ￿ a)
12xL = 1
3, xR = 2
3 is a strictly dominant strategy for L and R respectively. From the above density
function it can easily be concluded that a share-maximizing centrist candidate would locate himself at
xC = 1
3. Doing so, the share of votes each candidate gets will be sL = 0:222, sC = 0:381, sR = 0:397
where the rightist candidate will be the winner. If, however, the centrist candidate locates himself at
xC = 5
12 instead of 1
3, then clearly the share of votes of the leftist candidate will increase while the share
of votes of the rightist and centrist candidates will decrease. In fact, they take the following values:
sL = 0:329, sC = 0:35, sR = 0:321, meaning that the centrist candidate is the winner. So, the centrist
candidate not being able to win the election with the highest share of votes possible, can achieve this aim
with a lower share of votes by re-locating himself.
Therefore, the optimal strategy of a candidate that cares about winning under plurality does not need
to coincide with the strategy that maximizes his share of votes. His optimal strategy is the one that
makes him obtain the highest possible share of votes such that it is higher than the share of votes of
all his opponents. Only a candidate that can never win, to maximize his utility, will simply choose the
policy point which maximizes his share of votes.
4.1 Connected Intervals (a = b)
In this section, I analyze a situation where the intervals￿intersection consists only of a single point,
(a = b), that is, the permissible interval for the leftist, centrist and rightist candidates are [0;a], [a;1 ￿ a]
and [1 ￿ a;1] respectively where a 2 (0; 1
2).
Which type of equilibria would we observe for an arbitrary distribution of ideal points of voters? If
the ideal point of the median voter is located in the interval [0;a), or in the interval (1 ￿ a;1] then the
result is as follows:
Proposition 4: In equilibrium: xL = a and xR = 1￿a and xC 2 [a;1 ￿ a] that maximizes C￿ s share
of votes. The winner is the leftist candidate if m 2 [0;a) and the rightist candidate if m 2 (1 ￿ a;1].
Proof: L maximizes his share of votes at xL = a and R at xR = 1 ￿ a being a strictly dominant
strategy under Assumption 1.1. If m 2 [0;a), L is the winner because for xL = a, sL ￿ 1
2 which implies
13that sL > sj j 2 fR;Cg. If m 2 (1￿a;1], R is the winner because for xR = 1￿a, sR ￿ 1
2 which implies
that sR > sj j 2 fL;Cg. In both cases, C chooses xC 2 [a;1 ￿ a] such that he maximizes sC. #
Notice that, if the share of votes would not a⁄ect the utility of candidates, for m 2 [0;a), the leftist
candidate would be indi⁄erent between any xL 2 (m;a], since he would win the election for sure for any
choice of xL in this interval. Similarly, for m 2 (1 ￿ a;1], the rightist candidate would be indi⁄erent
between any xR 2 [1￿a;m) since he would win the election for sure for any choice of xR in this interval.
Now suppose that m 2 [a;1 ￿ a] and suppose that the distribution of ideal points of voters is rep-
resented by a continuous and increasing cumulative distribution function F(x) where f(x) is the corre-
sponding density function. Has the centrist candidate a chance to win? As above, xL = a and xR = 1￿a
are strictly dominant strategies for candidates L and R respectively under Assumption 1.1. Suppose that
the centrist candidate chooses a point x
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s:t: sC > sj j 2 fL;Rg
x
0
C 2 [a;1 ￿ a]
That is, the centrist candidate knowing the equilibrium strategies of the rightist and leftist candidates
will try to maximize his share of votes given that he wins. If the above maximization problem has no
solution, he will try to win at least with some probability that is, he will face the above maximization
problem with weak inequality(ies) for one of the two constraints or both. If it has no solution, then the







C 2 [a;1 ￿ a]
14That is, if he cannot win, he will only try to maximize his share of votes.
Now, consider the following three examples with a = 1






. In the ￿rst example, I show a situation in which the centrist candidate wins for sure and
in the second one a situation in which the centrist candidate can only tie with the other two candidates.
The last example shows a situation in which the centrist candidate has no chance of winning.
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The best responses of the leftist and rightist candidates are 1
3 and 2
3 respectively, since they are strictly
dominant strategies. Clearly, the centrist candidate maximizes his share of votes choosing xC = 1
3. If he
wins for sure with this choice, it means that it is his best response. Indeed, in this case sL = 3
12, sR = 4
12
and sC = 5
12. So, in equilibrium, the centrist candidate wins for sure and maximizes his share of votes for
xC = 1
3. If the shares of votes were not a part of the utility function of candidates, the centrist candidate
would be indi⁄erent among any xC close enough to 1
3 such that he still wins.
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As before, the best responses of the leftist and rightist candidates are 1
3 and 2
3 respectively. Clearly,
the centrist candidate maximizes his share of votes choosing xC = 1
3. For this choice, sL = sR = sC = 1
3.
If he would choose any xC di⁄erent from 1
3 his share of votes decrease while sL would increase making L
the winner. Therefore, in equilibrium all candidates have equal probability of winning.















3 ￿ x ￿ 1
As before, the best responses of the leftist and rightist candidates are 1
3 and 2
3 respectively. Therefore,
both L and R can guarantee themselves a share of vote of at least 1





































at least one of these two candidates obtains a share of votes larger than 1
4. Furthermore, the centrist
candidate gets the same share of votes for any choice of xC which is equal to 1
4. So, C can never win.
Therefore we have the following type of equilibria. If xC = 1
2, L and R tie in equilibrium. If xC 2 [1
3; 1
2),
R wins for sure. If xC 2 (1
2; 2
3], L wins for sure.
The conclusion that can be drawn from the above examples is that under an arbitrary distribution
of ideal points of voters, in many cases the centrist candidate has no chance of winning even if the ideal
point of the median voter is located in his interval.
In order to analyze the characteristics of the equilibrium outcome when the ideal point of the median
voter is located in the interval [a;1 ￿ a] consider a uniform distribution of ideal points of voters. The
following proposition states the conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in which the centrist can-
didate wins and also describes the equilibria where the centrist candidate can not win. The result is as
follows:
Proposition 5: In equilibrium: xL = a, xR = 1 ￿ a; if a < 1
6, xC 2 (3a;1 ￿ 3a) and C wins for
sure; if a = 1
6, xC = 1
2 and all three candidates win with equal probability; if a > 1
6 the winner is L if
xC 2 (1
2;1 ￿ a], R if xC 2 [a; 1
2) and R and L with equal probability if xC = 1
2.
Proof: As before, choosing xL = a, xR = 1 ￿ a is a strictly dominant strategy for L and R
respectively. For any choice of policy point of C, sC = 1￿2a
2 . If xC > 1
2, sL > sR. Therefore, C
wins if sC = 1￿2a
2 > sL = xC+a
2 i.e. if xC < 1 ￿ 3a. If xC < 1
2, sL < sR. Therefore, C wins if
sC = 1￿2a
2 > sR = a + 1￿a￿xC
2 i.e. if xC > 3a. So, C wins for sure choosing xC 2 (3a;1 ￿ 3a) which
17can only be a valid interval if a < 1
6. So, for a > 1
6, C has no chance of winning. Clearly, for a = 1
6,
the above conditions hold only for the case of equality leaving xC = 1
2 the only choice for C, resulting in
equal shares of votes for all three candidates. If a > 1
6, sC = 1￿2a
2 < 1
3, 8xC 2 [a;1 ￿ a]. So, C has no
possibility of winning. So, any xC 2 [a;1 ￿ a] could be an equilibrium strategy for C. If xC = 1
2, then
sL = sR. From the tie-breaking rule, L and R win with equal probability. If xC 2 (1
2;1 ￿ a], sL > sR.
So, L wins. If xC 2 [a; 1
2) then sL < sR. So R wins. #
The conclusion that can be drawn is that, with intervals intersecting at a single point the centrist
candidate can only win if the leftist and rightist candidates are forced to be polarized.
4.2 Disconnected Intervals (b > a)
Now I consider credible policy sets with b > a, that is, the intervals of the candidates do not intersect.
For this speci￿cation of intervals, for an arbitrary distribution of ideal points of voters, where the
ideal point of the median voter is located in the interval [0; a+b
2 ) or in the interval (1 ￿ a+b
2 ;1] the result
is as follows:
Proposition 6: Under an arbitrary distribution of ideal points, in equilibrium: xL = a and xR =
1 ￿ a.
i. If m 2 [0; a+b
2 ), L wins and C chooses the policy point that maximizes his share of votes.
ii. If m 2 (1 ￿ a+b
2 ;1], R wins and C chooses the policy point that maximizes his share of votes.
Proof: If m 2 [0; a+b
2 ), L wins because for xL = a, sL ￿ 1
2 which implies that sL > sj j 2 fR;Cg.
Notice that 8m 2 [0; a+b
2 ), xL = a is a strictly dominant strategy for L. xR = 1￿a is a strictly dominant
for R under Assumption 1.1. If m 2 (1 ￿ a+b
2 ;1], R is the winner because for xR = 1 ￿ a, sR ￿ 1
2 which
implies that sR > sj j 2 fL;Cg. Notice that 8m 2 (1￿ a+b
2 ;1], xR = 1￿a is a strictly dominant strategy
for R. xL = a is a strictly dominant strategy for R under Assumption 1.1. #
Di⁄erent from Section 4.1, in this case for the same value of a the intervals in which the winner is
the leftist or rightist candidate for sure for any distribution of ideal points of voters are larger since the
centrist candidate is forced to choose from a more restricted interval than before. If m is located in the
18interval [a+b
2 ;1 ￿ a+b
2 ] then as in Section 4.1 depending on the distribution of ideal points of voters the
winner can be the leftist, centrist or rightist candidate.
Now in order to describe the equilibrium characteristics when the ideal point of the median voter is
located in the interval [a+b
2 ;1 ￿ a+b
2 ] consider a uniform distribution. For a uniform distribution of ideal
points of voters the results are as follows:
Proposition 7: Under a uniform distribution of ideal points, with intervals such that b > a, in
equilibrium, xL = a and xR = 1 ￿ a. If a < 1
6, and a > b
3 then, in equilibrium, xC 2 (3a;1 ￿ 3a) and
he wins. If a < 1
6 and a ￿ b
3 then, in equilibrium, xC 2 [b;1 ￿ b] and he wins for sure. If, a > 1
6, and
xC 2 [b; 1
2), in equilibrium, the winner is the leftist candidate; if a > 1
6, and xC 2 (1
2;1￿b], the winner is
the rightist candidate. If a > 1
6, and xC = 1
2, in equilibrium, the leftist and rightist candidates win with
equal probability. If a = 1
6, in equilibrium, xC = 1
2, and all three candidates win with equal probability.
Proof: xL = a, xR = 1 ￿ a are strictly dominant strategies for L and R respectively implying that
for any choice of xC, sC = 1￿2a
2 . If C locates himself to the right of 1
2, sL > sR. Therefore, C wins if
sC = 1￿2a
2 > sL = a+ xC￿a
2 i.e. if xC < 1￿3a. If he locates himself to the left of 1
2, sR > sL. Therefore,
C wins if sC = 1￿2a
2 > sR = a + 1￿a￿xC
2 i.e. if xC > 3a . (3a;1 ￿ 3a) is a valid interval only if a < 1
6.
Notice that if 1 ￿ 3a > 1 ￿ b i.e. b
3 > a, then 1 ￿ 3a and 3a lie outside the interval of C. So,if a < 1
6
and a > b
3, C wins for sure choosing xC 2 (3a;1 ￿ 3a). If a < 1
6 and b
3 ￿ a, C wins for sure choosing
xC 2 [b;1￿b]. Clearly, for a = 1
6, the above inequalities hold only for the case of equality leaving xC = 1
2
as the only choice for C, resulting in equal shares of votes for all candidates. If a > 1
6, and xC = 1
2,
then sL = sR = 2a+1
4 > 1￿2a
2 = sC. From the tie-breaking rule, L and R win with equal probability. If
xC 2 (1
2;1 ￿ b], sL > sR. So, L is the winner. If xC 2 [b; 1
2) then sR > sL. So, R is the winner. #
The results are very similar to the ones of Proposition 5. The critical value, that makes the centrist
candidate the winner is the same, namely 1
6. The only di⁄erence is that, if we consider the same value
of a for both cases, since in the case at hand b > a, whether he wins or not, the interval in which the
centrist candidate can locate himself is smaller than it is in Section 5.1 leaving him with a smaller set of
choice.
4.3 Intervals Overlapping with Neighbors (b < a <1
2)
In the above analysis the intervals for the leftist and centrist candidates and the intervals for the rightist
and centrist candidates were intersecting only at a single point or not at all. Now, I analyze the case
where the intervals for the rightist and centrist candidates and the intervals for the leftist and centrist
19candidate overlap whereas the intervals of the leftist and rightist candidate do not intersect. That is,
1
2 > a > b.
In the previous two cases the credible policy sets were such that the centrist candidate would choose
for sure a policy point to the right of the leftist candidate and to the left of the rightist candidate. In the
case at hand, however, the centrist candidate can locate himself to the left of the leftist candidate or to
the right of the rightist candidate. For such a choice, he could not be considered as the centrist candidate
anymore being more leftist than the leftist or more rightist than the rightist candidate. Therefore, the
following assumption will be made:
Assumption 2: If xC < xL or xC > xR, then the centrist candidate gets no votes.
This assumption states that voters punish the centrist candidate by giving him no votes if he chooses
to be more leftist or more rightist than the corresponding candidate. That is, although voters consider
some policy choices as credible claims proposed by two di⁄erent candidates, they still force candidates
to locate themselves according their ideological labels. I assume for the whole section that voters behave
as Assumption 2 suggests. Without this assumption, there would exist no equilibrium for a uniform
distribution of ideal points of voters if a > 1
4. 7
For an arbitrary distribution of ideal points of voters, if the ideal point of the median voter is located
in the interval [0;a), or in the interval (1 ￿ a;1], the following result is obtained:
Proposition 8: Under an arbitrary distribution of ideal points, in equilibrium, xL = a, xR = 1 ￿ a;
i. If m 2 [0;a), L wins and C chooses the policy point that maximizes his share of votes.
ii. If m 2 (1 ￿ a;1], R wins and C chooses the policy point that maximizes his share of votes.
Proof: For both cases xL = a is a strictly dominant strategy for L giving him the highest share of
votes possible. Similarly, xR = 1￿a is a strictly dominant strategy for R. So, if m 2 [0;a), L wins since
for xL = a, sL ￿ 1
2. If m 2 (1 ￿ a;1], R wins since for xR = 1 ￿ a, sR ￿ 1
2. In both cases, C having no
chance of winning chooses xC 2 [a;1 ￿ a] that maximizes sC. #
7See the appendix for a formal anaysis
20If the location of the median voter is in the interval [a;1 ￿ a], then the winner would depend on the
distribution of the ideal points and the length of the intervals of the leftist and rightist candidates. Now
to be able to say more about what happens if m is in this interval, consider a uniform distribution of
ideal points. In this case, we get the following result:
Proposition 9: For intervals where 1
2 > a > b, and a uniform distribution of ideal points, in
equilibrium, xL = a, and xR = 1 ￿ a and:
i. If a < 1
6, xC 2 (3a;1 ￿ 3a) and the centrist candidate is the winner.
ii. If a = 1
6, then xC = 1
2, and all three candidates win with equal probabilities.
iii. If a > 1
6 and xC 2 [a; 1
2), the winner is the rightist candidate.
iv. If a > 1
6 and xC 2 (1
2;1 ￿ a], the winner is the leftist candidate.
v. If a > 1
6 and xC = 1
2 the leftist and rightist candidates win with equal probability.
Proof: In equilibrium, xL = a, and xR = 1 ￿ a as they are strictly dominant strategies. sC = 0 if
xC < a or xC > 1 ￿ a. So, in equilibrium, xC 2 [a;1 ￿ a]. Therefore, sC = 1￿2a
2 .
i. If xC 2 (1
2;1 ￿ a], sL > sR. Therefore, C wins if sC = 1￿2a
2 > sL = xC+a
2 i.e. if xC < 1 ￿ 3a. If
xC 2 [a; 1
2), sR > sL. Therefore, C wins if sC = 1￿2a
2 > sR = a+ 1￿a￿xC
2 i.e. if xC > 3a. So, C wins for
sure choosing xC 2 (3a;1 ￿ 3a) which can only be a valid interval if a < 1
6 meaning that C wins for sure
if a < 1
6.
ii. For a = 1
6, the above inequalities hold only for the case of equality leaving xC = 1
2 the only choice
for C, resulting in equal shares of votes for all three candidates. Notice that if a > 1
6, C can never win.
So, for a > 1
6, any xC 2 [a;1 ￿ a] could be included as an equilibrium strategy.
iii. If xC 2 [a; 1




2 = sL. So, R is the winner.
iv. If xC 2 (1




2 so that L is the winner.
v. If xC = 1
2, sL = sR = 1￿2a
2 . From the tie-breaking rule, L and R win with equal probability. #
The conclusion that can be drawn from the above result is that if the centrist candidate is required
to locate himself to the right of the leftist candidate and to the left of the rightist candidate, the results
are the same whether the intervals overlap or only intersect at a single point. Moreover, the interval of
the centrist candidate does not play a role. The only parameter that a⁄ects the outcome is, a, the one
that speci￿es the intervals of the leftist and rightist candidates.
4.4 Intervals Overlapping with all Opponents (1
2 ￿ a)
Finally, I consider the case where a ￿ 1
2.
21As in the previous section, I assume that voters behave according to Assumption 2. Without this
assumption, given that any xL 2 [0;b) and any xR 2 (1 ￿ b;1] are strictly dominated we would arrive at
the classical three candidate competition on the interval [b;1 ￿ b]. It is well known that an equilibrium
fails to exist. Moreover, now a leftist candidate could locate himself to the right of a rightist candidate.
Therefore, in addition to Assumption 1.1, I will use Assumption 1, which states how voters behave if the
leftist and rightist candidates are located on the same place. Notice that, this Assumption is applicable
without any modi￿cation because of the implications of Assumption 2.
Therefore, for an arbitrary distribution of ideal points a similar argument to Proposition 9 would also
hold for this case. Since a ￿ 1
2, we can de￿ne the winner for any type of distributions of ideal points of
voters. The leftist and rightist candidates would win with equal probability locating themselves at m. If
m 2 (1 ￿ a;a); L would win if m 2 [0;1 ￿ a] with xL = xR = 1 ￿ a and R would win if m 2 [a;1] with
xL = xR = a.
As a next step, I consider a uniform distribution of ideal points of voters. The result is as follows:
Proposition 10: Under a uniform distribution of ideal points of voters, the strategies xL = xR = 1
2
and xC 2 [b;1 ￿ b] constitute the only Nash Equilibrium for intervals being such that a ￿ 1
2, in which
the leftist and rightist candidate win with equal probabilities.
Proof: First check whether the above stated strategies constitute indeed an equilibrium. C is
indi⁄erent for any xC 2 [b;1 ￿ b] because from Assumptions 1.1 and 2, sC = 0. If L deviates R would
win for sure. So, he has no incentives to deviate. Similarly, if R deviates, L would win for sure. So, he
has no incentives to deviate neither. Now, suppose that there exists an equilibrium in which L and R are
located on a point di⁄erent from 1
2. If xL = xR 6= 1
2, they tie. So, both would have incentives to deviate
" to the right if xL = xR < 1
2 or " to the left if xL = xR > 1
2 to win for sure. If xR = 1
2 and xL 6= 1
2 R
would win. So, L has incentive to deviate to 1
2 for any choice of C where R and L would tie. A similar
argument holds if xR 6= 1
2 and xL = 1
2. If xL 6= 1
2 and xR 6= 1
2 then depending on the choice of C anyone
22of the three could be the winner. Then, L or R would have the incentive to move closer to each other to
increase at least their share of votes or even their probability of winning. So, having analyzed all other
possible cases, it can be said that there exists no other type of equilibrium than the one stated above. #
The above result shows that in equilibrium there is only place for two parties, namely the leftist and
rightist one. It can be said that in a society where the label of being "leftist" or "rightist" plays an im-
portant role "we arrive at the paradoxical situation that the Centre in￿ uences the whole of parliamentary
life in the very country in which the electoral system prevents the formation of a Centre party."8
4.5 Discussion of the Results
In the analysis above the equilibrium outcomes are described for di⁄erent credibility sets of candidates,
which cover all the possibilities. What do these outcomes have in common? In all cases, for leftist
and rightist candidates, it is a strictly dominant strategy to choose the policy point that is the most
centrist one of their credibility sets. Therefore, the choice of the centrist candidate is the result of the
maximization of his utility taking these strictly dominant strategies into account.
The winner depends heavily on the distribution of voters￿ideal points. The leftist or rightist candidates
are the winners if the median voter￿ s ideal point is located in their credibility set and they apply the policy
corresponding to the most centrist policy point allowed by their credibility sets. The optimal choice of
the centrist candidate depends on the distribution of voters￿ideal points. Under a uniform distribution
of ideal points, for instance, where the median voter￿ s ideal point is at the midpoint (C￿ s interval), the
centrist candidate can only win if his interval is four times as large as his opponents￿ . In this case, for a
policy choice that is not too far from his two opponents￿choices, that is, for a policy choice around the
middle point, the centrist candidate is the winner. A necessary condition such that the centrist candidate
wins is that the median voter￿ s ideal point belongs to the interval of the centrist candidate.
For an arbitrary distribution of ideal points, when the ideal point of the median voter is in the interval
of the centrist candidate, as it can be seen from the three examples given in Section 4.1 the winner can
be any of the three candidates depending on the distribution of ideal points of voters. As the examples
illustrate it might well happen that the centrist does not win even though his interval includes more than
half of the voters..
First, the centrist candidate needs heavily concentrated ideal points of voters around the middle of
the space. That is, a centrist candidate can only win if more than half of the voters￿ideal points are
8Duverger, 1964 p. 387
23located only in his credibility set. For some distributions he even needs 60% or more of support in his
credibility set. Secondly, some asymmetry in the distribution of ideal points gives the centrist candidate
higher chances of winning. That is, for a skewed distribution where the median voter is located at a point
to the left or right of the middle point but still only in the interval of the centrist candidate, a centrist
candidate can win with a less concentrated distribution in his credibility set compared to a symmetric
distribution9. In short, the centrist candidate needs a much higher amount of voters in his credibility set
compared to his opponents in order to have a chance to win the election.
One point that should be taken into account is that I only analyzed symmetric intervals. It should
not be di¢ cult to argue that, the conclusions would be almost identical under asymmetric intervals.
Of course, it should not be forgotten that this results are implied by plurality rule. Therefore, in order
to see whether this disadvantage of a centrist candidate would also hold under another election rule, in
the next section the same electoral competition as before will be analyzed under a run-o⁄ rule.
5 Restricted Electoral Competition With Three Candidates un-
der a Run-O⁄ Rule
Until now, I analyzed electoral competition of a single round under plurality rule. How would the outcome
change if candidates would run an electoral competition under a run-o⁄ rule? Under a run-o⁄ rule, if in
the ￿rst round none of the candidates reaches an absolute majority the candidates who got the ￿rst and
second highest amount of votes run for a second time whereas the other candidates are eliminated. The
winner is the candidate who gets the highest amount of votes in the second round, where in each round
voters are required to cast a new ballot. I assume that candidates cannot change their policy points after
the ￿rst round and that only the share of votes obtained in the ￿rst round a⁄ects candidates￿utilities.
That is because the ￿rst round shows the true preferences of voters, i.e. the true support of parties,
whereas in the second round some voters are forced to vote for their second best choice as their ￿rst
choice might have been eliminated in the ￿rst round.
We have seen that under an electoral competition where plurality rule is applied, the centrist candidate
is disadvantaged compared to his opponents. Does a run-o⁄ rule change this result? I analyze the results
for voters which behave according to Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 (where it is applicable). Clearly,
for a general distribution where the median voter·s ideal point is located in the interval of the leftist or
9These results were obtained by considering di⁄erent uni-modal Beta distributions.
24rightist candidate, these candidates would win for sure in the ￿rst round with an absolute majority. Thus
in run-o⁄ there is no need for the second round.
If m is located at a point which belongs only to the centrist candidate￿ s interval, the winner would
depend on the characteristics of the distribution.10 As in the previous sections, I consider a uniform
distribution of ideal points.
I ￿rst analyze the case where a = b and assume a uniform distribution of ideal points of voters. In
Proposition 5, I showed that for a < 1
6, the centrist candidate wins for sure under a one round election
system. So, for a < 1
6 he would compete for sure in the second round and would win for sure under
run-o⁄ rule as he would be located closer to the median voter compared to his opponent. Therefore, I
focus on the case where a ￿ 1
6. The results are as follows:
Proposition 11: In equilibrium:
i. If 1
6 ￿ a < 1
4 the centrist candidate wins for sure choosing xC 2 (a;1 ￿ 3a) or xC 2 (3a;1 ￿ a).
ii. If a = 1
4, the centrist candidate can at best win with probability 1
4 by choosing xC = 1
4 or xC = 3
4.
iii. If a > 1
4, for any xC 2 [a;1 ￿ a], the leftist and rightist candidates win with equal probability.
In all type of equilibria, xL = a and xR = 1 ￿ a.
Proof: Notice that xL = a and xR = 1￿a are strictly dominant strategies for L and R respectively.
Therefore, L can get at most half of the votes, which happens when xC = 1 ￿ a. Similarly, R can get
at most half of the votes, which happens when xC = a. sC = 1￿2a
2 < 1
2 since a ￿ 1
6. So, none of the
candidates can get more than half of the votes in the ￿rst round for any a.
i. Suppose that, C locates himself to the left of 1
2. Then, in order to get to the second round he has
to get more votes than L i.e. 1￿2a
2 > a + xC￿a
2 should be satis￿ed which holds for xC < 1 ￿ 3a. If C
locates himself to the right of 1
2, then, in order to get to the second round he has at least to get more
votes than R i.e. 1￿2a
2 > a + 1￿a￿xC
2 should be satis￿ed which holds for xC > 3a. So, C should choose
xC 2 [a;1 ￿ 3a) or xC 2 (3a;1 ￿ a] to get to the second round. Clearly, it can only be satis￿ed if a < 1
4
and these two intervals do not intersect for 1
6 ￿ a. Choosing xC = a or xC = 1 ￿ a, C would get in
the second round the same amount of votes as his opponent (R and L respectively). Therefore, choosing
xC 2 (a;1 ￿ 3a) or xC 2 (3a;1 ￿ a), C wins the second round for sure.
ii. If a = 1
4, then a = 1 ￿ 3a, so to have the chance to get to the second round after the tie-braking,
C has to choose xC = 1
4 or xC = 3
4. Doing so, he gets the same share of votes as his opponent in the
second round meaning that C could win after two ties.
10In this case, for an arbitrary distribution, it should be expected that the centrist candidate has more chances of winning
compared to the chances he has under plurality rule.
25iii. If a > 1
4, then for xL = a and xR = 1 ￿ a which are strictly dominant strategies, sj > sC
j 2 fL;Rg 8xC 2 [a;1 ￿ a]. So, L and R compete in the second round and win with equal probability
getting the same share of votes. #
If we compare the results of the run-o⁄ rule with the results of Section 5.1, it can be said that the
centrist candidate can win for a higher range of a as under plurality rule he wins for sure for a < 1
6 and
under run-o⁄ rule for a < 1
4. Moreover, in the cases where the centrist candidate can never win, di⁄erent
from before, under run-o⁄ rule his policy point choice does not a⁄ect the outcome. For any choice of
him, the other two candidates win with equal probability.
If b > a, that is when intervals do not intersect, and under a uniform distribution of ideal points of
voters, the centrist candidate wins under a one-round electoral system only if a < 1
6. So, for a < 1
6 he
would compete for sure in the second round and would win for sure under run-o⁄ rule as he would be
located closer to the median voter compared to his opponent. Therefore, as before, I consider only the
case where a ￿ 1
6. The result is as follows:
Proposition 12: For b > a, in equilibrium:
i. If 1
6 ￿ a < 1
4 and 1 ￿ 3a > b the centrist candidate wins for sure choosing xC 2 [b;1 ￿ 3a) or
xC 2 (3a;1 ￿ b].
ii. If 1
6 ￿ a < 1
4 and 1 ￿ 3a = b, the centrist candidate can win by tieing once choosing xC = b or
xC = 1 ￿ b.
iii. If 1
6 ￿ a < 1
4 and 1 ￿ 3a < b, for any xC 2 [b;1 ￿ b], the leftist and rightist candidates win with
equal probability.
iv. If a ￿ 1
4, for any xC 2 [b;1 ￿ b], the leftist and rightist candidates win with equal probability
In all type of equilibria, xL = a and xR = 1 ￿ a.
Proof: Notice that xL = a and xR = 1￿a are strictly dominant strategies for L and R respectively.
So, none of the candidates can get more than half of the votes in the ￿rst round for any a for a similar
reasoning as in Proposition 12.
i. Suppose that, C locates himself to the left of 1
2. Then, in order to get to the second round he has to
get more votes than L i.e. 1￿2a
2 > a+ xC￿x
2 should be satis￿ed which holds for xC < 1￿3a. If C locates
himself to the right of 1
2, then, in order to get to the second round he has to get more votes than R i.e.
1￿2a
2 > a + 1￿a￿xC
2 should be satis￿ed which holds for xC > 3a. So, C should choose xC 2 [b;1 ￿ 3a)
or xC 2 (3a;1 ￿ b] to get to the second round. These are valid intervals only if 1 ￿ 3a > b, which could
only hold if a < 1
4 since b > a should be satis￿ed. These two intervals do not intersect for 1
6 ￿ a. So, if
1
6 ￿ a < 1
4 and 1 ￿ 3a > b, C gets to the second round and wins the election.
26ii. If 1
6 ￿ a < 1
4 and 1 ￿ 3a = b, then C can only choose xC = b or xC = 1 ￿ b. So, he would get
the same share of votes as L or R respectively and could get to the second round by tieing. He wins the
second round for sure.
iii. If 1
6 ￿ a < 1
4 and 1 ￿ 3a < b, then C can not pass the ￿rst round since both L and R get more
votes than C. He gets the same share of votes for any xC 2 [b;1 ￿ b]. L and R pass to the second round
and tie in the second round getting the same share of votes.
iv. The same argument as in part (iii) holds. #
It can easily be concluded that the centrist candidate can win for a wider set of parameter values
than in a one-round election as under plurality rule he could only win for a < 1
6 while under run-o⁄ rule
he can also win for 1
6 < a < 1
4 if 1 ￿ 3a > b holds.
To compare the result with the case where the intervals intersect, consider intervals of the same length
for leftist and rightist candidates for both the cases where b = a and where b > a with 1
4 > a > 1
6. In
order to get to the second round, the policy choice of the centrist candidate has to be located close enough
to at least one of his opponents. However, for b > a, he might not locate himself close enough to one
of his opponents if b is too large (his interval too small), while for b = a this would not occur since the
intervals of the leftist and centrist candidates and the intervals of the rightist and centrist candidates
intersect. Therefore, if b > a, the centrist candidate does not win for sure under a run-o⁄system if 1
4 > a.
For 1
2 > a > b, the centrist candidate wins under a one-round electoral system only if a < 1
6. So, for
a < 1
6 he would compete for sure in the second round and would win for sure under run-o⁄ rule as he
would be located closer to the median voter compared to his opponent. Therefore, as before, I consider
only the case where a ￿ 1
6. The result is as follows:
Proposition 13: For 1
2 > a > b, in equilibrium:
i. If 1
6 ￿ a < 1
4 the centrist candidate wins for sure choosing xC 2 (a;1 ￿ 3a) or xC 2 (3a;1 ￿ a).
ii. If a = 1
4, the centrist candidate can win with probability 1
4 by choosing xC = 1
4 or xC = 3
4.
iii. If a > 1
4, for any xC 2 [a;1 ￿ a], the leftist and rightist candidates win with equal probability.
In all equilibria, xL = a and xR = 1 ￿ a.
Proof: Notice that xL = a and xR = 1 ￿ a are strictly dominant strategies for L and R respectively
and C never chooses xC < a or xC > 1￿a since he would get no votes for such a choice. So, none of the
candidates can get more than half of the votes in the ￿rst round for any a. So, the analysis becomes the
same as in Proposition 11. #
27Once again, under a run-o⁄ rule the centrist candidate can win under a higher range of parameters
compared to plurality rule. (for a < 1
6 under plurality and for a < 1
4 under run-o⁄) As in the one-round
case the parameter b plays no role. The only important parameter is a, the one de￿ning the length of
the intervals of the leftist and rightist candidates.
Finally, for a ￿ 1
2, if Assumption 2 is maintained as it was done for the analysis of the one-round
election, then the centrist candidate would continue to get no votes even under the run-o⁄ system and
the leftist and rightist candidates would tie twice.
5.1 Discussion of the Results
As it was done for electoral competition under plurality rule, in the analysis above the equilibrium
outcomes are described for di⁄erent credibility sets of candidates, which cover all the possibilities. In all
cases, for leftist and rightist candidates, it is a strictly dominant strategy to choose the policy point that
is the most centrist one of their credibility sets. Therefore, the choice of the centrist candidate is the
result of the maximization of his utility taking these strictly dominant strategies into account.
The winner depends on the distribution of the voters￿ideal points. If the median voter is located
in their credibility sets, the leftist and rightist candidates win without the need for a second round as
they obtain absolute majority in the ￿rst round. If the ideal point of the median voter is located in the
credibility set of the centrist candidate then the winner depends on the characteristics of the distribution
and the size of the credibility sets of each candidate.
In that case, given that neither the leftist nor the rightist candidate gets more than half of the votes
in the ￿rst round, that is, given that they do not win the election already in the ￿rst round, for a centrist
candidate it is su¢ cient to come second in the ￿rst round to win the election. The fact that the leftist or
the rightist candidate does not get more than half of the votes in the ￿rst round implies that the ideal
point of the median voter is located in the interval of the centrist candidate. So, it can easily be argued
that if the centrist candidate quali￿es for the second round he will for sure be closer to the ideal point
of the median voter than his opponent in this round. This is true because if it weren￿ t the case, that is,
if his opponent in the second round is closer to the ideal point of the median voter, this opponent would
already have acquired more than half of the votes in the ￿rst round.
A centrist candidate would also win for sure under run-o⁄ rule for all parameter values for which he
would win under plurality rule. Why is this true? If a centrist candidate wins under plurality rule for
28a given policy choice then he would also win the ￿rst round under the run-o⁄ rule for the same policy
choice as the equilibrium policy choice of the leftist and rightist candidates is the same under both rules.
We know that if a centrist candidate wins under plurality rule he is necessarily closer to the median voter
compared to his two opponents. So, for the same policy choice he would win for sure the second round.
Then the question that arises is whether the centrist candidate would win for a higher parameter range.
For the plurality rule there exists a critical value of a beyond which the centrist candidate can never win.
Suppose we take an a slightly larger (a0 = a+"). We know that the centrist candidate would win for sure
if he gets to the second round. So, the only possibility that he does not win is that he becomes third for
any policy choice in the ￿rst round. It can be shown that if a ￿ b, that the centrist candidate can still
win under run-o⁄ rule for " su¢ ciently small. On the other hand, if b > a, then if b is su¢ ciently large,
it can be found examples for which the centrist candidate can never win if a is only slightly higher than
the critical value So, we can conclude that the centrist candidate would (weakly) win for a larger set of
parameter values under run-o⁄ rule compared to plurality rule.
As before, I only analyzed symmetric intervals. It should not be di¢ cult to argue that, the conclusions
would be almost identical under asymmetric intervals.
6 Conclusion
The model I have analyzed uses the credibility that voters assign to candidates to introduce restrictions
on the candidates￿strategies. I assume that exogenously given restrictions about the policy space specify
the policy points that candidates can credibly propose. This limitation can prevent full convergence in
terms of candidates￿policy choices.
For two candidate competition, we obtain that the policy choices in equilibrium are di⁄erent from the
proposed by the median voter theorem, when the credibility of candidates prevents total convergence to
the median voter.
For three candidate competition, the results imply that in many cases, although a majority of voters
could be considered as ideologically centrist, centrist candidates have less chances of winning. This
conclusion veri￿es Duverger￿ s statement mentioned before up to some point. It is not uniquely the
plurality rule that leads to outcomes where only two candidates get a considerable amount of votes;
credibility of candidates plays also an important role. Since candidates are assumed to be o¢ ce-motivated,
leftist and rightist candidates have incentives to converge to each other as much as their intervals allow.
29The centrist candidate prefers to be as close as possible to one of his opponents for more asymmetric
distributions of ideal points of voters, whereas for symmetric distributions he prefers to be as far as
possible from all his opponents. The centrist candidate is better-o⁄ the larger is his interval and the
smaller the interval of his opponents.
As it was discussed before, it can be said that the larger the interval of a candidate, the higher is his
credibility. Therefore, whenever the intervals of the three candidates do not intersect, it can be concluded
that as the credibility of a candidate increases, his probability of winning increases. A candidate with a
larger interval would obtain higher share of votes; therefore as the credibility of a candidate increases,
his utility also increases.
It can easily be argued that not only the distribution of voters but also the election rule determines the
winner in the model analyzed in this paper. The model shows that leftist and rightist candidates would
prefer a one-round electoral competition (plurality rule) whereas a centrist candidate would be better o⁄
under a run-o⁄ rule. That is, the election rule might help to obtain more centrist outcomes. Broadly
speaking, the electoral competition in UK can be considered as a three party competition where plurality
rule applies. As Taagepera and Shugart (1989) state British Liberals favored changes in the electoral rule
which continues up today, as the plurality rule favors the two parties (Labor and Conservatives) on the
left and right wings, whereas these two parties are quite happy with the system.
If the intervals of credible policies of the leftist and rightist candidates intersect, a centrist candidate
cannot get any vote. Therefore, one should expect that in countries where leftist and rightist parties have
high credibility, the electoral competition would take place between two parties. Centrist parties would
arise when there is a policy interval that cannot be reached by any leftist or rightist party. The chance
of winning of a centrist candidate would increase with the size of his interval and with a decrease in the
size of the intervals of his opponents.
One important assumption maintained during the analysis is that there is no abstention. One further
step would be discard this assumption and think that a voter would not vote for any candidate if they
are too far away from his ideal point. In this case we could reach equilibria in which leftist and rightist
candidates might diverge more than they do without abstention as they would have two con￿ icting
incentives, namely, being close to the centrist candidate to "steal" some of his votes, and secondly not to
loose rather radical voters.
With regard to the voters, I assume, moreover, that voters vote truthfully. The next step would be
to allow voters to vote strategically. Under strategic voting, pre-election polls would play an important
30role to provide voters information about the distribution of ideal points and to coordinate themselves.
Under strategic voting with the aid of pre-election polls, I expect to verify Duverger￿ s Law, that is I would
obtain results where only the leftist and rightist candidates get a positive share of votes because voters
whose most preferred candidate is the centrist one would prefer to vote for the less evil of the other two
candidates if they expect that the centrist candidate has no chance of winning.
7 Appendix
Proposition 14: For 1
2 > a > b, if a > 1
4, then there exists no equilibrium in pure strategies under
Assumption 1.1 and a uniform distribution of ideal points of voters.
Proof: First notice that as in the previous cases any xL 2 [0;b) is strictly dominated by xL = b and
any xR 2 (1 ￿ b;1] is strictly dominated by xR = 1 ￿ b. Therefore in any equilibrium xL 2 [b;a] and
xR;xC 2 [1 ￿ a;1 ￿ b]. Now, consider all possible equilibria. First, consider the possible equilibria with
xC 2 [a;1￿a]. In that case, in equilibrium xL = a and xR = 1￿a, as any other strategy for them would
be strictly dominated. So, sC = 1￿2a
2 . C would deviate to a ￿ ￿ or 1 ￿ a + ￿ if a > 1￿2a
2 i.e. if a > 1
4.
So there exists no equilibrium with xC 2 [a;1￿a] if a > 1
4. Now consider possible equilibria with xL;xC
2 [b;a]. Then in any equilibrium xR = 1 ￿ a as it is a strictly dominant strategy. (Notice that the case
with xR;xC 2 [1 ￿ a;1 ￿ b] would just be the symmetric of the case at hand). Now consider the case
where xL < xC. This cannot be part of an equilibrium as L would deviate to xL +￿ to increase his share
of votes. So, we should have xL ￿ xC. Now suppose that xL = xC = k 2 [b;a]. Then, sC = 1￿a￿k
2 and
sL = k. C would deviate to k ￿￿ if sL > sC and L would deviate to k +￿ if sL > sC. So, there can exist
an equilibrium if sL = sC i.e. if sL = sC = k = 1￿a
3 . This would be possible if 1￿a
3 ￿ a i.e. if a ￿ 1
4.
But if a > 1
4 then C would deviate to 1 ￿ a + ￿ as it would increase its share of votes. So, there would
exist an equilibrium i⁄ a = 1
4. Finally, consider the case xL > xC where xC = k. Then, C would deviate
to k +￿ to increase his share of votes. So, combining all possible cases it can be seen that there exists no
equilibrium if a > 1
4. #
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